Abstract. Bogdanov and Lee suggested a homomorphic public-key encryption scheme based on error correcting codes. The underlying public code is a modified Reed-Solomon code obtained from inserting a zero submatrix in the Vandermonde generating matrix defining it. The columns that define this submatrix are kept secret and form a set L. We give here a distinguisher that detects if one or several columns belong to L or not. This distinguisher is obtained by considering the code generated by component-wise products of codewords of the public code (the so called "square code"). This operation is applied to punctured versions of this square code obtained by picking a subset I of the whole set of columns. It turns out that the dimension of the punctured square code is directly related to the cardinality of the intersection of I with L. This allows an attack which recovers the full set L and which can then decrypt any ciphertext.
Introduction
The concept of homomorphic encryption was first proposed in 1978 in [RAD78] . But it took more than three decades to see the first scheme of this kind [Gen09] . It is based on ideal lattices. Since then several proposals have been made, most of them rely on lattice theory. One challenging issue is to come up with a homomorphic encryption scheme using different security assumptions. Recently, the first symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme based on error-correcting codes was proposed in [AAPS11]. This work was then followed by [BL12] which can be considered as the first publickey homomorphic scheme based on coding theory. This particular cryptosystem heavily relies on properties of Reed-Solomon codes. These codes have been suggested for the first time in a publickey cryptosystem in [Nie86] but it was shown to be insecure in [SS92] . The attack recovers the underlying Reed-Solomon allowing the decoding of any encrypted data obtained from a McEliecetype cryptosystem based on them. The McEliece cryptosystem [McE78] on the other hand uses Goppa codes. Since its apparition, it has withstood many attacks and after more than thirty years now, it still belongs to the very few unbroken public key cryptosystems. This situation substantiates the claim that inverting the encryption function, and in particular recovering the private key from public data, is intractable.
No significant breakthrough has been observed with respect to the problem of recovering the private key [Gib91, LS01] . This has led to claim that the generator matrix of a binary Goppa code does not disclose any visible structure that an attacker could exploit. This is strengthened by the fact that Goppa codes share many characteristics with random codes: for instance they asymptotically meet the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, they typically have a trivial permutation group, etc. Hence, the hardness of the Goppa code distinguishing problem, which asks whether a Goppa code can be distinguished from a random code, has become a classical belief in code-based cryptography, and as a consequence, a mandatory assumption to prove semantic security in the random oracle model [NIKM08] , CCA2 security in the standard model [DMQN09] and security in the random oracle model against existential forgery [CFS01,Dal07] of the signature scheme [CFS01].
In [FGO + 11], an algorithm that manages to distinguish between a random code and a Goppa code has been introduced. This work without undermining the security of [McE78] prompts to wonder whether it would be possible to devise an attack based on such a distinguisher. It was found out in [MCP12] that our distinguisher [FGO + 11] has an equivalent but simpler description in terms of the component-wise product of codes. This notion was first put forward in coding theory to unify many different algebraic decoding algorithms [Pel92, Köt92] . This distinguisher is even more powerful in the case of Reed-Solomon codes than for Goppa codes because, whereas for Goppa codes it is only successful for rates close to 1, it can distinguish Reed-Solomon codes of any rate from random codes. In the specific case of [BL12], the underlying public code is a modified Reed-Solomon code obtained from inserting a zero submatrix in the Vandermonde generating matrix defining it and in this case our distinguisher leads to an attack. We present namely in this paper a key-recovery attack on the Bogdanov-Lee homomorphic scheme based on the version of our distinguisher presented in [MCP12] . Our attack runs in polynomial time and is efficient: it only amounts to calculate the ranks of certain matrices derived from the public key.
More precisely, in their cryptosystem the columns that define the zero submatrix are kept secret and form a set L. We give here a distinguisher that detects if one or several columns belong to L or not. This distinguisher is obtained by considering the code generated by component-wise products of codewords of the public code (the so called "square code"). This operation is applied to punctured versions of this square code obtained by picking a subset I of the whole set of columns. It turns out that the dimension of the punctured square code is directly related to the cardinality of the intersection of I with L. This allows an attack which recovers the full set L and which can then decrypt any ciphertext.
It should also been pointed out that the properties of Reed-Solomon codes with respect to the component-wise product of codes have already been used to cryptanalyze a McEliece scheme based on subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes [Wie10] . The use of this product is nevertheless different in [Wie10] from the way we use it here. Note also that our attack is not an adaptation of the Sidelnikov and Shestakov approach [SS92] . Our approach is completely new: it illustrates how a distinguisher that detects an abnormal behaviour can be used to recover the private key.
In Section 2 we recall important notions from coding theory. In Section 3 we introduce the cryptosystem and in Section 4 we present the key recovery attack.
Reed-Solomon codes and the square code
We recall in this section a few relevant results and definitions from coding theory and bring in the fundamental notion which is used in the attack, namely the square code. A linear code C of length n and dimension k over a finite field GF (q) of q elements is a subspace of dimension k of the full space GF (q) n . It is generally specified by a full-rank matrix called a generator matrix which is a k × n matrix G (with k ≤ n) over GF (q) whose rows span the code:
It can also be specified by a parity-check matrix H, which is a matrix whose right kernel is equal to the code, that is
where x T stands for the column vector which is the transpose of the row vector x. The rate of the code is given by the ratio k n . Code-based public-key cryptography focuses on linear codes that have a polynomial time decoding algorithm. The role of decoding algorithms is to correct errors of prescribed weight. We say that a decoding algorithm corrects t errors if it recovers u from the knowledge of uG + e for all possible e ∈ F n q of weight at most t. Reed-Solomon codes form a special case of codes with a very powerful low complexity decoding algorithm. It will be convenient to use the definition of Reed-Solomon codes and generalized ReedSolomon codes as evaluation codes Definition 1 (Reed-Solomon code and generalized Reed-Solomon code). Let k and n be integers such that 1 k < n q where q is a power of a prime number. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be an n-tuple of distinct elements of GF (q). The Reed-Solomon code RS k (x) of dimension k is the set of (p(x 1 ), . . . , p(x n )) when p ranges over all polynomials of degree k − 1 with coefficients in GF (q). The generalized Reed-Solomon code GRS k (x, y) of dimension k is associated to a couple (x, y) ∈ GF (q) n × GF (q) n where x is chosen as above and the entries y i are arbitrary non zero elements in GF (q). It is defined as the set of (y 1 p(x 1 ), . . . , y n p(x n )) where p ranges over all polynomials of degree k − 1 with coefficients in GF (q).
Generalized Reed-Solomon codes are quite important in coding theory due to the conjunction of several factors such as : (i) their minimum distance d is maximal among all codes of the same dimension and length since they are MDS codes (their distance is equal to n − k + 1), (ii) they can be efficiently decoded in polynomial time when the number of errors is less than or equal to
It has been suggested to use them in a public-key cryptosystem for the first time in [Nie86] but it was discovered that this scheme is insecure in [SS92] . Sidelnikov and Shestakov namely showed that it is possible to recover in polynomial time for any generalized Reed-Solomon code a possible couple (x, y) which defines it. This is all what is needed to decode efficiently such codes and is therefore enough to break the Niederreiter cryptosystem suggested in [Nie86] or a McEliece type cryptosystem [McE78] when Reed-Solomon are used instead of Goppa codes.
We could not find a way to adapt the Sidelnikov and Shestakov approach for cryptanalyzing the Bogadnov and Lee cryptosystem. However a Reed-Solomon displays a quite peculiar property with respect to the component-wise product which is denoted by a ⋆ b for two vectors a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) and which is defined by a ⋆ b def = (a 1 b 1 , . . . , a n b n ). This can be seen by bringing in the following definition Definition 2 (star product of two codes, square code). Let A and B be two codes of length n. The star product code denoted by < A ⋆ B > of A and B is the vector space spanned by all products a ⋆ b where a and b range over A and B respectively. When B = A , < A ⋆ A > is called the square code of A and is denoted by < A 2 >.
It is clear that < A ⋆ B > is also generated by the a i ⋆ b j 's where the a i 's and the b j 's form a basis of A and B respectively. Therefore
We expect that the square code when applied to a random linear code should be a code of dimension of order min k+1 2 , n . Actually by using the proof technique of [FGO + 11] it can be shown for instance that with probability going to 1 as k tends to infinity, the square code is of dimension min k+1 2 (1 + o(1)), n when k is of the form k = o(n 1/2 ). On the other hand generalized Reed Solomon codes behave in a completely different way Proposition 2. < GRS k (x, y) 2 >= GRS 2k−1 (x, y ⋆ y).
This follows immediately from the definition of a generalized Reed Solomon code as an evaluation code since the star product of two elements c = (y 1 p(x 1 ) , . . . , y n p(x n )) and c ′ = (y 1 q(x 1 ) , . . . , y n q(x n )) of GRS k (x, y) where p and q are two polynomials of degree at most k − 1 is of the form
where r is a polynomial of degree ≤ 2k−2. Conversely, any element of the form (y 2 1 r(x 1 ), . . . , y 2 n r(x n )) where r is a polynomial of degree less than or equal to 2k −1 is a linear combination of star products of two elements of GRS k (x, y).
This proposition shows that the square code is only of dimension 2k − 1 when 2k − 1 ≤ n, which is quite unusual. This property can also be used in the case 2k − 1 > n. To see this, consider the dual of the Reed-Solomon code. The dual C ⊥ of a code C of length n over GF (q) is defined by
where (x, y) = x i y i stands for the standard inner product between elements of GF (q) n . The dual of a generalized Reed-Solomon code is itself a generalized Reed-Solomon code, see [MS86, Theorem 4, p.304] Proposition 3.
where the length of GRS k (x, y) is n and y ′ is a certain element of GF (q) n depending on x and y.
Therefore when 2k − 1 > n a Reed-Solomon code GRS k (x, y) can also be distinguished from a random linear code of the same dimension by computing the dimension of < GRS k (x, y) ⊥ 2 >. We have in this case
and we obtain a code of dimension 2n − 2k − 1. The star product of two codes is the fundamental notion used in the decoding algorithm based on an error correcting pair [Pel92,Köt92] which unifies common ideas to many algebraic decoding algorithms. It has been used for the first time to cryptanalyze a McEliece scheme based on subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes [Wie10] . The use of the star product is nevertheless different in [Wie10] from the way we use it here. In this paper, the star product is used to identify for a certain subcode C of a generalized Reed-Solomon code GRS k (x, y) a possible pair (x, y). This is achieved by computing < C 2 > which in the case which is considered turns out to be equal to < GRS k (x, y) 2 > which is equal to GRS 2k−1 (x, y ⋆ y). The Sidelnikov and Shestakov is then used on < C 2 > to recover a possible (x, y ⋆ y) pair to describe < C 2 > as a generalized Reed-Solomon code. From this, a possible (x, y) pair for which C ⊂ GRS k (x, y) is deduced.
The Bogdanov-Lee Cryptosystem
The cryptosystem proposed by Bogdanov and Lee in [BL12] is a public-key homomorphic encryption scheme based on linear codes. It encrypts a plaintext m from GF (q) into a ciphertext c that belongs to GF (q) n where n is a given integer. The key generation requires a non-negative integer ℓ such that 3ℓ < n and a subset L of {1, . . . , n} of cardinality 3ℓ. A set of n distinct elements x 1 , . . . , x n from GF (q) are generated at random. They serve to construct a k × n matrix G whose i-th column G T i (1 i n) is defined by:
where the symbol T stands for the transpose. In other words, when L is the set {1, . . . , 3ℓ}, G is the following matrix:
The cryptosystem is now defined as follows.
-Secret key: (L, G).
-Public key: P def = SG where S is a k × k random invertible matrix over GF (q). -Encryption: the ciphertext c ∈ GF (q) n of a plaintext m ∈ GF (q) is obtained by picking x in GF (q) k uniformly at random and e in GF (q) n by choosing its components according to a certain distributionη, then computing c def = xP + m1 + e where 1 ∈ GF (q) n is the all-ones row vector.
-Decryption: the linear system (1) is solved for y def = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ GF (q) n :
(1)
The decryption algorithm will output the correct plaintext when ℓ and n are chosen such that the entry e i at position i of the error vector is zero when i ∈ L. The distribution η which is used to draw at random the coordinates of e is chosen such that this property holds with very large probability. To check the correctness of the algorithm when this property on e holds, notice that the linear system (1) has 3ℓ unknowns and ℓ + 1 equations and since it is by construction of rank ℓ + 1, it always admits at least one solution. Then observe that The parameters k, q, ℓ and the noise distributionη are chosen such as
-the noise distributionη is the q-ary symmetric channel with noise rate η = Θ 1/n 1−α/4 , that is Prob(e i = 0) = 1 − η and Prob(e i = x) = η q−1 for any x in GF (q) different from zero;
where α is some constant in the range (0, 4 An efficient attack on the Bogdanov-Lee homomophic cryptosystem
Outline
The attack consists in first recovering the secret set L and from here finds directly a suitable vector y by solving the system
Indeed, requiring that P y T = 0 is equivalent to SGy T = 0 and since S is invertible this is equivalent to the equation Gy T = 0. Therefore System (2) is equivalent to the "secret" system (1). An attacker may therefore recover m without even knowing G just by outputting i y i c i for any solution y of (2). In the following subsection, we will explain how L can be recovered from P in polynomial time.
Recovering L
Our attack relies heavily on the fact that the public matrix may be viewed as a the generator matrix of a code C which is quite close to a generalized Reed-Solomon code (or to a Reed-Solomon if a row consisting only of 1's is added to it). Notice that any punctured version of the code has also this property (a punctured code consists in keeping only a fixed subset of positions in a codeword). More precisely, let us introduce Definition 3. For any I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of cardinality |I|, the restriction of a code A of length n is the subset of GF (q) |I| defined as:
The results about the unusual dimension of the square of a Reed-Solomon codes which are given in Section 2 prompt us to study the dimension of the square code < C 2 > or more generally the dimension of < C 2 I >. When I contains no positions in L, then C I is nothing but a generalized Reed-Solomon code and we expect a dimension of 2k −1 when |I| is larger than 2k −1. On the other hand, when there are positions in I which also belong to L we expect the dimension to become bigger and the dimension of < C 2 > to behave as an increasing function of |I ∩ L|. This is exactly what happens as shown in the proposition below. 
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix A. An attacker can exploit this proposition to mount a distinguisher that recognizes whether a given position belongs to the secret set L. At first a set I which satisfies with high probability the assumptions of Proposition 4 is randomly chosen. Take for instance |I| = 3k. Then d 
